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THE HONORABLE EDITH H. JONES*
The excellent articles in this Symposium issue, which it is my pleasure to
introduce, comprise a microcosm of the bankruptcy galaxy. The bankruptcy
galaxy travels within the universe of American law and society, but for many
years it has been perceived as a self-contained entity. Bankruptcy might have
rubbed up against other systems in the legal universe, for example tax and
commercial law, but the impact of these collisions was mild and there was no
felt need to reconcile bankruptcy goals with competing social and legal
imperatives. However, the isolation of bankruptcy has been shattered by
Congress's drive to reform the system; the bankruptcy galaxy has confronted
the American universe as never before. An astronomical metaphor may seem
awkward, but it conveys both the internal structure of bankruptcy and the
system's relations with law and society in general. After sketching the
symposium articles through their relation to the bankruptcy galaxy, I will add
a few words about the collision among worlds that inspired bankruptcy reform
legislation.
These symposium articles display the diversity of issues subsumed by
bankruptcy as well as the surprising uncertainty in the law and gaps in our
knowledge of the now-twenty-year-old system spawned by the Bankruptcy
Code. The center of the galaxy consists of "simple" matters of debt collection
and debt relief, exemplified by Professor Mattingly's article.' When the
Supreme Court rejected2 the Durrett rule,3 which held that some foreclosure
sales were susceptible to attack in bankruptcy court as fraudulent transfers,
many people assumed the coast was clear for regularly conducted foreclosure
sales. Professor Mattingly disagrees, contending that artificially low creditor
bid-ins at foreclosure may yet be challenged as preferential transfers. Thus, at
the heart of the galaxy that represents traditional bankruptcy, the relationship
of debtors and secured creditors, there is flux and uncertainty.
As we move within the traditional realm of bankruptcy to the Chapter 11
reorganization, we confront the vacuum of empirical knowledge about the
system. Much of the bankruptcy galaxy remains mysterious, unexplored, and
unexplained by means of economic and social scientific research. Mr. Ancel
*Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; Member, National
Bankruptcy Review Commission 1995-1997.
1. Basil H. Mattingly, Reestablishment of Bankruptcy Review of Oppressive
Foreclosure Sales: The Interaction ofAvoidance Powers as Applied to Credit Bid-Ins, 50 S.C.
L. REv. 365 (1999).
2. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
3. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
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and Professor Markell have begun filling the void with their report on the
incidence and success of Chapter 11 reorganizations in two Midwestern
districts during the early 1990s.' Painstaking, on-the-ground research of this
sort is a key ingredient of bankruptcy policymaking.
The traditional bankruptcy galaxy affects worlds outside bankruptcy when
it impinges on tax codes. Not only does bankruptcy cause an enormous loss of
revenue to public authorities, but it also consumes vast administrative
resources. The policies behind tax and bankruptcy law fundamentally conflict,
as Professor Williams and Ms. Ogier's article demonstrates with respect to
Chapter 13.- Exacerbating the policy conflict are technical and confusing rules
for the payment or discharge of debtors' tax claims. A simple and consistent,
friction-reducing theory, like that proposed by Professor Williams, would
provide a model for other intersections of bankruptcy and the worlds outside.
Bankruptcy takes on a wholly new dimension when, in the guise of
adjusting debtor-creditor relations, it attempts to absorb the sub-galaxy of tort
law dealing with mass torts. Unlike the instances in which bankruptcy law
faces off against a competing regime of law, such as tax or commercial law or
government regulatory authority, the conflict of bankruptcy with mass torts is
not a fair fight. That is because mass torts are a description of a legal problem
for which no solution has been crafted, little law has been formulated, and
hence, no legal or policy hierarchy has developed. Bankruptcy exists to protect
the debtor, but no substantive-law scheme yet identifies how to quantify mass
tort claims, what priority they should receive, or the assets-present or
future-from which mass tort claimants may seek compensation. Mr. Rice and
Ms. Davis's article explains how bankruptcy procedure and policy thus threaten
to engulf relatively amorphous mass tort claims without satisfactorily resolving
them.6
The metaphysical aspect of bankruptcy cosmology resides in the hoary
adage that bankruptcy court is an equity court. Invoking equity, bankruptcy
courts can do pretty much whatever they think best in individual cases-if the
parties have enough money to litigate and raise the pertinent issues before the
courts. But what will happen if the equity label is proved false? Judge
Krieger's7 meticulously researched article challenges the equity adage and, in
so doing, may provoke a reexamination of contemporary bankruptcy's deepest
premises. Reading and applying law and formulating general rules are different
tasks than using legal principles to "do equity." Approaching bankruptcy from
4. Steven H. Ancel and Bruce A. Markell, Hope in the Heartland: Chapter 11
Dispositions in Indiana and Southern Illinois, 1990-96, 50 S.C. L. REV. 345 (1999).
5. Jack F. Williams & Tamara Miles Ogier, A Collision of Policy: Chapter 13 and
Taxes, 50 S.C. L. REv. 313 (1999).
6. Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims:
Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C.
L. REv. 407 (1999).
7. Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity:" What Does That
Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275 (1999).
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the standpoint of a law court instead of an equity court may, in my view, lead
to a more even balance between debtors' and creditors' rights. In any event,
rejecting the equity court adage will clarify bankruptcy courts' image and
discourage attorneys from making stale, sterile appeals to equity at the expense
of rigorous legal reasoning.
The subjects discussed in this Symposium all reside firmly within the
bankruptcy galaxy. They illumine the system and will contribute to its
improvement. But the galaxy itself is about to become a different place, no
longer isolated or insulated. The apparent cause of the change will be
bankruptcy reform legislation, which is a high priority in Congress. However,
the actual cause is this decade's enormous increase in personal bankruptcy
filings. The escalation in filings has revealed many little facts, the cumulative
proof that in case after case, bankruptcy's powerful debt-relief tools are often
misused. To complete the metaphorical explanation, the disturbance within the
bankruptcy galaxy is thus precipitated by intragalactic evolution, which has
forced a response from the outside universe. Or, to put it bluntly, bankruptcy
has become a victim of its own success.
Bankruptcy's "success" appears graphically in the rising number of
individual case filings. Since 1990, bankruptcy cases have nearly doubled,
reaching 1.4 million case filings in 1998. Astonishingly, this escalation has
occurred during a time of unprecedented national prosperity. Although the
increase has not been definitively explained, it is not far offthe mark to suggest
that rising bankruptcy filings beget more filings. As more citizens file
bankruptcy, there is a wider awareness of its generous debt relief provisions
and increased social acceptance of the resort to bankruptcy. At one time,
personal shame and social stigma would have bedeviled people filing
bankruptcy, and their credit rating would have been ruined. That is no longer
true. Hollywood stars, sports celebrities, and even political figures file
bankruptcy petitions with aplomb, often crowing about their ability to shelter
valuable assets. Lenders have carved out the euphemistically-named sub-prime
market for borrowers with bad credit ratings, which often derive from past
bankruptcy filings. Finally, the impact of advertising by lawyers and by
bankruptcy mills should not be underestimated. The result is an entirely
different cultural attitude toward bankruptcy than existed even a short time ago
in our history. The change is vividly demonstrated by one comparison: more
people sought bankruptcy relief in the first half of 1997 than during the entire
decade of the Great Depression!
The argument is made that creditors, particularly credit-card issuers, are to
blame for increasing bankruptcies because of allegedly misleading advertising
or imprudent credit granting policies. In my view, this argument is a red
herring. Professor Todd Zywicki and I have analyzed and refuted the creditors-
1999]
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cause-bankruptcy theory in another article.8 Suffice it to say in this compressed
format that although creditors' practices may not fulfill our most exacting
specifications, it is debtors who charge the purchases, who undertake excessive
financial obligations, who decide when to seek bankruptcy protection, and
who, increasingly, file bankruptcy before they have actually fallen behind in
payments to creditors. Personal responsibility plays an important role.
The increase in filings has gone hand in hand with a new administrative
model for bankruptcy. Most consumer bankruptcies are now filed by
professionals who specialize in the area, handling dozens of new cases each
month. Bankruptcy is traditionally a field in which compensation is relatively
low and the risk of nonpayment relatively high. To make a go of it, bankruptcy
lawyers have to operate a volume practice, and this requires heavy reliance on
paralegals and interns. Ethical risks proliferate because the lawyers are unable
to devote proper attention to each client. The consequences of poor lawyering
are visited most severely upon clients, but also upon the creditors and courts.
Oversight of the integrity of the bankruptcy system has also been impaired
by the large volume of cases. Not only debtors' lawyers, but Chapter 13
trustees, panel trustees, the U.S. Trustee, and the bankruptcy courts themselves
are responsible for maintaining public confidence in the system. These
participants also cleave to an outdated notion that they can accomplish
individually equitable outcomes while processing dozens of cases at a time. To
take but one or two examples, consider the panel trustee who regularly holds
docket call for fifty cases per hour. To what extent can the trustee scrutinize the
accuracy of the debtors' schedules and statements of affairs? Judges often hold
reaffirmation hearings in which dozens of creditors are present, and courts
conduct Chapter 13 confirmations at breakneck speed. Judges can hardly
observe or investigate abuses when the dockets are moving so swiftly.
Similarly, the U.S. Trustees' offices are overwhelmed with routine
administrative burdens, and their ability to control the integrity of these systems
is correspondingly diminished.
In a system that, much like the federal income tax system, depends upon
the integrity of the individual participant, is it any wonder that debtors are
advised or easily learn of ways to manipulate bankruptcy for additional
advantage? Opportunities for fraud and abuse abound, beginning with the filing
of the debtor's schedules and statement of affairs, which are supposed to recite
all of the debtors' assets available to pay creditors. It is widely understood that
these schedules are simply not to be trusted, even though they are filed under
penalty of perjury. A few debtors file multiple bankruptcies in order to forestall
foreclosure rather than to gain a fresh start. Others buy new automobiles prior
to filing, counting on a "cramdown" to reduce their post-Chapter 13 payments.
Others may simply go on a shopping spree, knowing that the bankruptcy court
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will relieve them of the responsibility to pay for the purchases.
The abuse of prerogatives afforded a debtor in bankruptcy is just as
detrimental to the system as outright fraud. Abusive practices employ the letter
of the law for an unworthy or improper purpose. For example, ex-husbands
may resort to bankruptcy to avoid paying child support and alimony or to
reduce the state-court-ordered payments. A business partner may file
bankruptcy to circumvent a lawsuit with other partners or pressure them for a
change of control. Tort-feasors, such as doctors who commit malpractice, may
discharge in bankruptcy the judgments for injury they caused others. Ponzi
scheme artists can file bankruptcy to "reorganize" their debts. Wealthy debtors
can move to a jurisdiction in which liberal exemption laws allow them to
shelter millions in homestead equity from creditors. And, of course, the test for
obtaining bankruptcy relief is so standardless that well-off, income-earning
people can and do file for the convenience of shedding debts.
Personal responsibility and institutional accountability have been severely
eroded by the contemporary bankruptcy system. Only a reform of the
underlying law can reinstill public confidence and realign bankruptcy policy
to promote individual responsibility as well as humane debt relief. Legislation
that would take important steps toward realizing these goals nearly passed
Congress in 1998 and is being re-introduced in the current session. The
principal goals of the reform package are to enhance the reliability of
disclosures made by debtors, to curtail obviously fraudulent and abusive
devices, and to institute a modest-means test that requires well-off, income-
earning debtors to repay a portion of their unsecured debts.
Many bankruptcy professionals and judges have voiced strident objections
to the reform legislation. Three principles lie behind the objections: an atavistic
preference for the status quo, no matter what its effects on the larger economy;
a preference for equity rather than specific legal rules; and visceral dislike of
any means-testing formula. In another article, Professor Zywicki and I have
explained the legislative means-testing formula and responded to its critics, so
I will not repeat our arguments here. The other two objections are as vehement
as they are wrong, and they are intertwined.
A defense of the status quo necessarily involves the preference for the
"equitable" concept of the bankruptcy court. Granting the accuracy of Judge
Krieger's criticism of bankruptcy court as an equity court, the bankruptcy law
is nevertheless riddled with discretionary grants of authority. Practically no
sanction is mandatory. Discharge is only rarely to be denied, and
nondischargeability claims by creditors are to be construed narrowly in favor
of the debtor. Hardly any deadlines are fixed, notwithstanding that from a
creditor's standpoint, time is money.
Discretion may have been an acceptable characteristic of the old
bankruptcy regime, when social factors discouraged filing and the courts' much
lighter dockets permitted actual scrutiny of each case. Now that filings have
skyrocketed to over one million cases per year-and no reforms proposed by
Congress would dramatically lower that number-discretion is at best
1999]
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superfluous and at worst mischievous. Courts that process bankruptcy cases en
masse have few opportunities to exercise the discretion that exists. The
flexibility of the rules and lack of standards enable debtors to exploit the
bankruptcy process with little expectation ofbeing sanctioned. Liberal exercise
of judicial discretion also leads to widely varying and, therefore, to unfair
results among districts and even among individual courts within the same
district. If Congress chooses to enact firm rules that discourage manipulative
practices and enhance uniformity, why is this objectionable? Congress
represents the collective will of the American people, and it is entitled to
replace judicial discretion with firm rules. Paradoxically, many of the defenders
of the status quo acknowledge the existence of debtor abuses even as they carp
about limiting the judges' discretion.
No advocate of bankruptcy reform wishes to uproot America's uniquely
liberal debt system. However, reform is mandated for the sake of the greater
good. As more people seek bankruptcy relief, bad-debt losses escalate.
Creditors' losses are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for
goods and services and credit. Unfortunately, lower-income Americans bear the
brunt of bankruptcy-enhanced costs, as they are members of the class more
likely to file for protection. Those who struggle to pay their bills each month
in effect subsidize ever larger numbers of debtors who are either able to repay
some debts or are unfairly manipulating the system. More ominously, given the
high level of bankruptcy filings during a period of economic prosperity, one
must be concerned that a precipitous increase will occur when the economy
turns down. The bankruptcy system and the consumer credit system could
suffer severely.
The need for bankruptcy reform is manifest. The first steps for
accomplishing it are relatively easy, and they are embodied in the specific
proposals passed by Congress in 1998. The administrative model that has
served bankruptcy in the past must be replaced with clearer standards in
recognition of the present inability of the system to do equity in each case. The
bankruptcy system has served its humanitarian purpose well, and it will
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